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The Concept of Judicial Independence
It is almost universally acknowledged that one of the hallmarks of a
democracy is the independence of the Judiciary. A Judiciary which exists
merely to do a Government's bidding or to implement Government policy
provides no guarantee of liberty. What do we mean by independence of the
Judiciary? The former Chief Justice of Tasmania, Sir Guy Green has defined
it as "the capacity of the courts to perform their constitutional function free
from actual or apparent interference by, and to the extent that it is
constitutionally possible, free from actual or apparent dependence upon, any
persons or institutions, including, in particular, the executive arm of
government, over which they do not exercise direct control."
The maintenance of public confidence in the impartiality of Judges is
essential to public acceptance of the law and the legal system. A loss of that
public confidence can lead to instability and even a threat to the very
existence of society.

In the late seventeenth century in England, the

politicisation of the Judiciary and its subservience to the Crown was a
material factor in the Revolution of 1688.

One of the complaints against

George III recited in the American Declaration of Independence was that,
"He has made Judges dependent on his will alone, for the tenure of their
offices, and the amount and payment of their salaries."
There are many occasions upon which a Judge is required to decide
what is just, what is fair or what is reasonable. In cases of that kind, a Judge
necessarily seeks to apply basic values representative of community values.
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In doing so, he or she does not merely reflect public opinion, or is influenced
by prejudice, emotion or sentiment. The Judicial Oath requires every Judge
to administer justice according to law, without fear or favour, affection or
ill-will. Parliamentary democracy and the rule of law are dependent for their
existence on an independent Judiciary. The partisan administration of the law
is a denial of the rule of law.
The recognition of the principle of the independence of the Judiciary
does not make Judges immune from criticism.

However, only in very

exceptional cases will charges of contempt be brought in respect of criticism
of the Judiciary. Nevertheless, any member of the public has the right to
criticise in good faith in public or in private any decision by the Court or a
Judge. Provided there is no imputation of improper motives or any attempt to
impair the administration of justice, anyone is entitled to make fair comment,
even outspoken comment, on matters of public interest.

International Recognition of the need for Judicial Independence
The need for judicial independence has now been recognised on an
international basis. The Asia-Pacific Region has done so by its adoption of
the Beijing Statement of Principles of the Independence of the Judiciary in
the LAWASIA Region ("The Beijing Principles"). The Beijing Principles
reflect an agreement between the Chief Justices from a range of countries
throughout the Asia-Pacific Region on the minimum standards necessary to
secure judicial independence in their respective countries. Since the early
1980s, development of the concept of judicial independence at the
international level, in particular by the enumeration of its key features, has
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taken place through instruments such as the International Bar Association's
Minimum Standards of Judicial Independence (1982) ("New Delhi
Standards") and the United Nation's Draft Principles on the Independence of
the Judiciary (1981) ("Siracusa Principles"), the UN Basic Principles on the
Independence of the Judiciary (1985) ("Basic Principles") and Draft
Universal Declaration on the Independence of Justice (1989) ("Singhvi
Declaration").
The Beijing Principles originated from a statement of principles
formulated by the LAWASIA Human Rights Committee and a small number
of Chief Justices and other Judges at a meeting in Tokyo in July 1982.
"LAWASIA" is the acronym of the Law Association of Asia and the Pacific.
It is an association of lawyers, law teachers and Judges founded in 1966
which is committed to the protection of human rights and the maintenance of
the rule of law by an independent Judiciary. It covers the same Region
covered by the United Nations Economic and Social Committee for Asia and
the Pacific ("ESCAP") which reaches from Afghanistan to the Russian
Federation, Japan and Korea and extends south to Sri Lanka and the
Seychelles, Australia, New Zealand and the countries of the Western Pacific.
I have been a member of LAWASIA since 1968 and Chairman of the Judicial
Section since 1989.
The Judicial Section has been responsible for the promotion of the
biennial Conference of Chief Justices of Asia and the Pacific, held
contemporaneously with the general LAWASIA Conference.
Conferences have been held every two years since 1985.

These

The First

Conference took place in Penang, Malaysia and subsequent conferences have
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been held in Islamabad, Pakistan 1987; Manila, Philippines 1989 and 1997;
Perth, Australia 1991; Colombo, Sri Lanka 1993; Beijing, People's Republic
of China 1995; and Seoul, Korea, 1999. The 10th Anniversary Conference of
Chief Justices of Asia and the Pacific is being held in Tokyo in September
2003.
In 1991, the Conference accepted a recommendation I made that the
Chief Justices develop a Regional statement of the principles of the
independence of the Judiciary. Some years previously, the United Nations
had published a statement of the basic principles of the Independence of the
Judiciary and recommended that more detailed statements be developed in
the various individual UN Regions around the world.

The Asia-Pacific

Region was the first of the United Nations Regions to attempt to develop
such a statement. In August 1995, at the Sixth Conference of Chief Justices
of Asia and the Pacific in Beijing, I presented a paper entitled the Second
Revised Statement of Principles of the Independence of the Judiciary. After
further amendment, all 20 Chief Justices present unanimously adopted the
Beijing Statement of Principles of the Independence of the Judiciary in the
LAWASIA Region ("The Beijing Principles").

The Chief Justices of 38

countries in the Region have now subscribed to the Beijing Principles. They
have the full support of the United Nations and the United Nations
Rapporteur on the Independence of the Judiciary, Mr Param Cumaraswary
who was appointed to that position by the Secretary General of the United
Nations.

The adoption of the Beijing Principles was a remarkable

development. It is quite extraordinary that nations, from the two countries
with the world's largest populations to some of the smallest countries with
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widely different legal and political systems were able to reach a consensus on
the minimum standards necessary to maintain judicial independence.
There are six key aspects of the Beijing Principles. These are the
judicial function1,

the

concept

of

judicial

independence2, judicial

appointments 3, security of tenure 4, jurisdictional issues 5 and resources and
finance6.

The Judicial Function
The first key aspect of the Beijing Principles is the definition of the
parameters of the judicial function. An appreciation of the parameters of the
judicial function is central to an understanding of the concept of judicial
independence. It is these parameters which provide the legitimate foundation
for the set of safeguards which we call the principles of judicial
independence. They find expression in Article 10 of the Beijing Principles.
Article 10 provides that the objectives and functions of the Judiciary include:
(i)

to ensure that all persons are able to live securely under the Rule of
Law;

(ii)

to promote, within the proper limits of the judicial function, the
observance and the attainment of human rights within its own
society; and

(iii)

to administer the law impartially between citizen and citizen and
between citizen and State.

1

Encapsulated in Article 10 of the Beijing Principles
Encapsulated in Articles 3 and 4 of the Beijing Principles
3
Encapsulated in Articles 11 and 12 of the Beijing Principles
4
Encapsulated in Articles 18 and 21 of the Beijing Principles
5
Encapsulated in Articles 33 and 34 of the Beijing Principles
2
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These functions complement and overlap each other. For example, it is to the
Judiciary that the power of, and responsibility for, resolving disputes
according to law is given. 7 The natural consequence of this allocation of
responsibility is that the judicial power must be exercised by a consistent and
unwavering application of the Rule of Law. It follows that the Judiciary must
apply the Rule of Law impartially to all matters brought before it.
In turn, such an application of the Rule of Law tends to protect persons
from the infringement of human rights, to the extent that they are recognised
by the Rule of Law that applies in a particular country. There is room, within
the historical and cultural context of a country, for a legitimate debate about
the appropriate scope of human rights within that country. However, insofar
as those rights are recognised, the Judiciary can play an important part in
upholding them, whenever the powerful attempt to abridge them in an ad hoc
or arbitrary manner. As Mr L.V. Singvi observed in his Final Report to the
United Nations Commission on Human Rights in 1985: "The strength of
legal institutions is a form of insurance for the rule of law and for the
observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms and for preventing the
denial and miscarriage of justice."8

The Concept of Judicial Independence
The second key aspect is the concept of judicial independence itself.
What judicial independence means is set out in Article 3 of the Beijing
6

Encapsulated in Articles 41 and 42 of the Beijing Principlesf
The Hon Justice RD Nicholson AO, Judicial Independence and Accountability: Can they Co-exist? (1993)
67 Australian Law Journal 404 at 410-411
8
Singhvi, LM Final Report to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights (1985) at n 44
7

10 th Conference of Chief Justices
The Independence of the Judiciary in the Asia-Pacific Region

Page 6

The Hon David Malcolm AC
Chief Justice of Western Australia

Principles which provides that the independence of the Judiciary requires
that:
(i)

the Judiciary shall decide matters before it in accordance with its
impartial assessment of the facts and its understanding of the law
without improper influences, direct or indirect, from any source;
and

(ii)

the Judiciary has jurisdiction, directly or by way of review, over all
issues of a justiciable nature.
These first two aspects of the Beijing Principles are fundamental. The

subsequent provisions of the Beijing Principles constitute the machinery that
works to maintain judicial independence, which is essential to the fulfilment
of the judicial function.

Judicial Appointments
The third aspect of requirement of the Beijing Principles relates to
judicial appointments. If we seek from our Judges an attitude of impartiality
and the ability and determination to enforce the Rule of Law, it is important
that the selection process which leads to judicial appointments should be
calculated to supply individuals of this calibre. Articles 11 and 12 of the
Beijing Principles provide that:
(11) To enable the Judiciary to achieve its objectives and perform its
functions, it is essential that Judges be chosen on the basis of proven
competence, integrity and independence.
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(12) The mode of appointment of Judges must be such as will ensure the
appointment of persons who are best qualified for judicial office. It
must provide safeguards against improper influences being taken into
account so that only persons of competence, integrity and
independence are appointed.
In the process of appointment of Judges, it is necessary that the
influence of the Executive should be kept to a minimum in order to reduce
potential for improper considerations.

This also has the advantage of

encouraging public confidence in the impartiality of appointees. To further
encourage such public confidence, the selection process should be open and
formal.
The independence of the Judiciary, as an institution, from the
Executive and Parliament, is commonly referred to as institutional
independence.9 In contrast, the freedom from interference to which a Judge
is entitled is known as individual independence. Individual independence is
an essential safeguard for the maintenance of impartiality. Impartiality is the
duty of a Judge. The guarantee of freedom from improper influence is the
means by which performance of that duty by all Judges can best be
achieved.10

Security of Tenure

9

The Hon Justice RD Nicholson, n 7, p 405
The Hon Justice MD Kirby, The Abolition of Courts and Non-reappointment of Judicial Officers in
Australia (1994) at 3
10
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Security of tenure is one of the most important aspects of individual
independence and is the fourth key aspect of the Beijing Principles. Without
a guarantee of tenure, subject to the proper performance of his or her judicial
function, there is no guarantee that the fear of losing his or her appointment
will not, even subconsciously, influence the decision of a Judge, thereby
infringing the principle of judicial impartiality and diminishing the rule of
law.

Holding an appointment at the pleasure of the Executive can do

irreparable damage to both the appearance, and fact, of impartial decision
making. In contrast, tenure promotes both the appearance, and the fact, of
impartiality, because it: "…insulates Judges from the need to worry about
political reaction to their decisions."11
The need for security of tenure finds expression in Articles 18 and 21
of the Beijing Principles which provide that:
(18)

Judges must have security of tenure.

(21)

A Judge's tenure must not be altered to the disadvantage of a
Judge during his or her term of office.

Due recognition is given to national differences which incorporate
confirmation procedures for tenure. 12 However, recognition is also given to
the ideal of judicial appointments which, in the ordinary course, only
terminate upon the attainment of a set age.13
Inevitably, there will be occasions upon which the Executive has an
apparently legitimate claim to the termination of a judicial appointment,
11

Dieng, A., The Rule of Law and the Independence of the Judiciary: An Overview of Principles (1992) 1
CIJL Yearbook 21 at p 29
12
See Beijing Principles Article 19
13
See Beijing Principles Article 20
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because of a failure to carry out the judicial function. 14 In these cases, it is
vital that the processes adopted to test such a claim are carefully handled. As
a minimum, the process for removal should incorporate a thorough and
impartial investigation of the reasons put forward for removal, as is suggested
in Article 25 of the Beijing Principles. Provision should be made for the
appointment by Parliament of an independent tribunal of inquiry to inquire
into any allegation of misbehaviour and make recommendations to the
Parliament thereon. As Article 26 of the Beijing Principles states, there
should be a right to a fair hearing, and in accordance with Article 27 of those
Principles, there should be a judgment which is based on established
standards of judicial conduct.
A related issue is the non-reappointment of a Judge upon the abolition
of the court of which he or she was a member. This, as has been pointed out
by Justice Kirby, has the potential to damage judicial independence because,
"if judicial officers are repeatedly removed from their offices, and not
afforded equivalent or higher appointments, the inference must be drawn that
their tenure is, effectively, at the will of the Executive."15 This result could be
avoided if, upon abolition of a court, the Judges of the former court are
appointed to the new court, or offered an equivalent appointment or full
compensation. Article 29 of the Beijing Principles provides for this.
Articles 31 and 32 of the Beijing Principles relate to the conditions of
judicial service.

Judges must be provided with adequate and secure

remuneration. It is important for judicial remuneration to be commensurate
14

See Beijing Principles Article 22
The Hon Justice M.D. Kirby, The Abolition of Courts and Non-reappointment of Judicial Officers in
Australia (1994) at p.3
15
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with the office of a Judge. First, it assists to attract suitable persons capable
of meeting the exacting demands of judicial office. Secondly, it minimises
the potential for litigants to exercise financial influence over the decision
making process.

Thirdly, it promotes institutional independence by

contributing to the status of the Judiciary as an institution.
As Article 31 of the Beijing Principles stipulates that remuneration
should be secure, in the sense that it may not be reduced or otherwise altered
to the detriment of a Judge during the term of office. A Judge who faces the
possibility of financial disadvantage if his or her decisions displease the
Executive is not placed in a position from which it is easy to exercise the
judicial function with true impartiality.
A legitimate exception to this principle may be made where the
reduction in remuneration is across the board, non-discriminatory and agreed
to by the Judges concerned, there would be no adverse implications for
individual judicial independence, however, institutional independence may
still be at risk.

Jurisdictional Issues
The Beijing Principles also deal with jurisdictional issues, which is the
fifth key aspect of the Principles. The Beijing Principles point out that a
failure to recognise the exclusive jurisdiction of the Courts over matters of a
justiciable nature constitutes a potential threat to the institutional
independence of the Judiciary. The benefits of an impartial and independent
Judiciary are of no value if a matter within the jurisdiction of a court is
diverted to a specialist tribunal in which none of the hallmarks of impartiality
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and independence are observed.16 Article 34 of the Beijing Principles asserts
that the jurisdiction of the highest court in a society should not be limited or
restricted without the consent of the members of the court. As Article 33 of
the Beijing Principles states, the Judiciary should be given exclusive
authority to decide whether an issue submitted for its decision is within its
competence as defined by law.
Resources and Finance
The sixth key aspect of the Beijing Principles is relevant to the
resources and finance of the Courts. One area where there is a potential
threat to the independence of the Judiciary is in the financing of the work of
the Courts.

It must be accepted that Parliament is responsible for the

appropriation of funds to operate the Courts in the same way as for any other
arm of the government. The constitutional position in relation to money bills,
however, gives effective control over the appropriation of funds for the Court
to the Executive government. Hence the Judiciary is financially dependent
on the Executive. A potential threat to judicial independence is posed by the
preparation of judicial estimates by anyone not acting under the direction of
the Judiciary and, by the exercise of control by the Executive over the way in
which the courts expend the funds granted to them.
Obviously, modern court systems must be operated with public funds.
These can only be raised and appropriated by Parliament. Someone must
account to Parliament for the way in which the money is spent. Under the
Westminster system there must always be a Minister who has this
responsibility. Hence, there cannot be total independence of the Judiciary in
16

The Hon Justice R.D. Nicholson, Judicial Independence and Accountability: Can they Co-exist? at p.415
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the sense of an absence of accountability. It remains however, the duty of
Parliament and the Executive to provide adequate financial resources for the
due administration of justice.
A possible way of ensuring judicial independence could be providing
for a guarantee of judicial autonomy with respect to courts' budgets and staff.
In Western Australia in 1993, the Independent Commission to Review Public
Sector Finances, appointed by the incoming Court Government chaired by
Mr Lesley McCarrey, recommended that the Judiciary should have a separate
budget allocation and be able to manage the finances of the courts.

It

recommended that the vote for the law courts be separately identified in the
Consolidated Revenue Fund estimates and should be determined after
discussion between the Treasurer and the Chief Justice each year 17. It is a
matter of some regret that this recommendation was not implemented.
In order for the Judiciary to discharge their functions they require two
particular categories of administrative services.

The first relates to the

reception, filing, organisation of the documents and legal processes relating
to any legal proceedings, the management and listing for hearing of the cases
to be heard, and the recording, processing and implementation of the orders
and judgments made by the Courts, together with the processing of appeals.
These services are provided by the staff of the Registry of the Court. The
other category comprises the services of those persons who provide direct
support to the Judges such as their personal staff, including associates,
research assistants, secretaries and ushers as well as court reporters and

17

Report of the Independent Commission to Review Public Sector Finances: Agenda for Reform, Vol 1,
August 1993, Western Australia at pp55-56 (the "McCarrey Report")
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librarians. The extent of control by the Judiciary over both these areas of
administrative services is a measure of judicial independence.
In 1984, Chief Justice King, then Chief Justice of South Australia said,
"A court should be in a position to command out of its own resources the
personnel and the physical necessities to carry on its work without reference
to the executive branch. So far this has proved to be unattainable, except in
the case of the High Court of Australia … The best which we have been able
to achieve is the convention that it is the responsibility of the executive arm of
government to provide unconditionally the necessary resources for the
administration of justice and to respect without question the integrity and
independence of the Judiciary." In Western Australia, the courts have yet to
match the South Australian achievement, although the integrity and
independence of the Judiciary has not been questioned.
The prosecution and trial of persons accused of criminal offences is not
a Government programme which can be cut or expanded dependent upon the
availability of funds. It is essential that those who have been charged with
offences are brought to trial without delay. The function of the Judiciary to
preside over and decide the cases brought before the Courts, either by
criminal prosecutions or civil litigants or by appeals, is likewise not a
Government programme which can be cut or expanded depending on the
general availability of funds. The functions performed by the Courts and the
services rendered to the community by the Judiciary are both essential and
independent. Access to the Courts is a critical aspect of the rule of law. It
follows that the obligation of Parliament and the Executive is to provide the
necessary resources to enable the Judiciary and those who assist them to
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manage the flow of trials, appeals and other proceedings within the Courts
without undue delay.
Models of administration adopted in various courts impact on the
independence of the Judiciary. This issue was discussed at the 7th Conference
of Chief Justices of Asia and the Pacific in Manila 1997. Prior to the
Conference, I asked the Chief Justices to provide me information on the
procedures applicable to the appointment of staff, the management and
allocation of matters before the Court and the setting of budgets.

The

objective was to obtain an overview of the administrative and financial
structures of Courts in the Region. It should be noted that the review was not
intended to identify and recommend to the Chief Justices the most
appropriate form of management structure. To make such a recommendation,
going beyond the general statements contained in Articles 36 and 37 of the
Beijing Principles would need to take into account differences in the cultural
and legal or constitutional histories of each country, in addition to the
resources available to each Court.

Instead, the review was designed to

provide an opportunity for the Chief Justices to understand the differences
between the jurisdictions represented at the Conference and to provide
material to aid future discussion of the methods of ensuring the
administrative independence of the Judiciary.
The section on Appointment and Employment of Administrative
Personnel dealt with the services involved in the reception, filing,
organisation of the documents and legal processes relating to any legal
proceedings, the management and listing for hearing of the cases to be heard

10 th Conference of Chief Justices
The Independence of the Judiciary in the Asia-Pacific Region

Page 15

The Hon David Malcolm AC
Chief Justice of Western Australia

and the recording, processing and implementation of the orders and
Judgements made by the Courts, together with the processing of appeals.
In all but three countries' Courts, administrative staff were employed as
members of the relevant public service agencies. In the majority of Courts,
the administrative staff were appointed by a senior administrative officer
and/or relevant public service agency in accordance with a legislative or other
formal regime established by the legislature. While on its face this tends to
suggest that the Courts have little independence from the legislature or
executive, it should be noted that in most cases, the appointment of
administrative staff involved a senior administrative officer within the Court
and/or an appointment board or commission. In a large number of Courts,
the Chief Justice is responsible for the discipline and supervision of
administrative staff. For example, the administrative staff of the Subordinate
Courts of Singapore are selected and appointed by the Public Service
Commission, which delegates its authority to a Judiciary Personnel Board.
The Board consists of members of the Judiciary of the Supreme and
Subordinate Courts in addition to a member of the Public Service Division.
Following appointment, the administrative staff remain under the supervision
of the Registrar, subject to the control of the Senior District Judge. In the
case of the Supreme Court of Nepal, administrative staff is appointed in a
similar manner, in conjunction with a Judicial Service Commission and
remain under the supervision of the Judges of the Court to which they are
appointed.
The position of the Supreme Courts of Pakistan, Japan and the High
Court of Australia was of particular interest. In the case of Pakistan, the
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administrative staff of the superior courts is appointed, remunerated and
supervised by their respective Courts directly, in the exercise of a
constitutional guarantee of independence. The process of appointment is
governed by Rules of Court. Once appointed, the junior administrative staff
remains under the supervision of the Registrar as administrative manager of
each Court, who is also appointed by the Court.
Each Court within the Japanese hierarchy manages the appointment
and supervision of its staff directly by virtue of a similar constitutional
guarantee of independence. In the Supreme Court of Japan, this guarantee is
carried into effect by virtue of Articles 12 and 13 of the Court Organisation
Law.18 Article 12 provides that: "In its conduct of judicial administrative
affairs, the Supreme Court shall act through the deliberations of the Judicial
Assembly and under general supervision of the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court." Article 13 provides that: "The Supreme Court shall have a general
Secretariat which shall administer the miscellaneous affairs of the Supreme
Court."
By comparison, the High Court of Australia manages its administrative
staff by virtue of the establishment of an independent management structure
by legislation. While the Commonwealth Constitution establishes a Judiciary
as an independent arm of government, the Constitution is silent in terms of
the Court's administrative independence. Members of the administrative staff
are appointed by the Chief Executive and Principal Registrar of the Court

18

Court Organisation Law, Law No.59, 1947
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pursuant to the High Court of Australia Act 1979, enacted some 79 years after
the Commonwealth Constitution.19
While the ability of the Judiciary to appoint administrative staff
independent of interference by the legislature, or, more likely, a Minister or
other member of the executive is a desirable guarantee of independence, it
remains and ideal. I note that in the majority of Courts, the wages and
salaries of administrative staff are paid either from consolidated revenue, or
the budget of a government department, following its appropriation from a
national budget.

While the government continues to meet the financial

demands of the Court, it is only reasonable to expect that, in the majority of
cases, they will seek to retain some control over the management of
administrative staff.
In those jurisdictions where the Judiciary has been established as an
independent organisation, administrative staff are paid by the Court itself. I
have already outlined the structure of the Supreme Court of Japan. In the
High Court of Australia, the payment of the wages and salaries of
administrative staff is governed by the High Court of Australia Act. Section
37, for example, provides that: "Moneys paid to the High Court shall be
applied only in payment of any remuneration and allowances payable under
this Act to any person other than a Justice".
Judges in the majority of the Courts in the Asia-Pacific Region have
personal staff. The nature of such staff varies widely from the inclusion of
what could be termed "domestic staff", such as gardeners or housekeepers
through to the appointment of legally trained research assistants. In only
19

High Court of Australia Act 1979 (Cth)
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50% of those Courts in which personal staff are appointed does the Judge
appoint the staff member himself or herself. In most other cases it is the
Registrar or manager of the Court, or the government department charged
with responsibility for the Court, that appoints the Judges' personal staff. In
terms of independence, this may present a number of difficulties.

For

example, an inefficient or unsuitable staff member may have a direct impact
on the efficiency of the Judge, particularly where the Judge relies on that staff
member for services which he or she cannot perform himself or herself. In
Western Australia, appointments of Judges' personal staff are made by the
Attorney General at the request of the Chief Justice.
Another related question is how the independence of personal staff
members is guaranteed. For example, where the appointment and conditions
of a staff member are subject to the control of an individual or agency
separate from the Judiciary, difficulties may arise if there is a dispute
between the staff member and that department. A dispute about the level of
remuneration is an example. Such a dispute would have a direct impact on
the Judge to whom the staff member is appointed. I note that in all cases, the
wages or salaries of the Judges' personal staff are ultimately paid from
consolidated revenue.
In a little over one third of the Courts surveyed in the AsiaPacific Region, the Judges do not have personal staff. They are, however,
often assigned additional administrative staff to support and assist them in
their duties. In the majority of cases, similar issues to those that I have
identified in relation to administrative staff would also arise.
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In some jurisdictions these issues are dealt with by the establishment of
a distinct administrative structure. In Japan for example, Judges' personal
staff are appointed in a similar manner to the balance of the administrative
staff. In Hong Kong, the manager of judicial administrative affairs, called the
Judiciary Administrator, appoints the staff.

In both cases, a "pool" of

available staff is created from which a Judge is assigned staff.
It should be noted that, in the majority of those Courts in which
personal staff are appointed by a body external to the Judiciary, the Judges to
whom staff are assigned retain supervisory and disciplinary control over their
day-to-day tasks.
The procedures adopted for Case Management and Listings in each of
the Courts, can be dealt with shortly. Scheduling the sittings of the Court,
the management of the lists and the assignment of Judges to particular
matters are generally undertaken under the supervision of, or with the direct
involvement of, the Chief Judicial Officer in each jurisdiction, a council or
committee of Judges or the Judge assigned to a particular matter. In all
jurisdictions, therefore, this aspect of the administrative management of the
Courts is under the direct control of the Judiciary. For example, in the Court
of Appeal and High Court of New Zealand, the sittings of the Court are
managed by the Chief Justice, pursuant to the legislation that establishes each
Court. Section 60 of the Judicature Act 1908 (NZ) provides that:
"(1) The Court of Appeal may from time to time appoint
ordinary or special sittings of the Court, and may from time to time
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make rules…in respect of the places and times for holding sittings of
the court…"
Section 52(1) subss. (a) and (b) of the Judicature Act, dealing with the
High Court, provides that:
"(1) Any three or more Judges, of whom the Chief Justice shall
be one, may from time to time(a)

Appoint sittings of the court for the dispatch or civil and

criminal business; and
(b)

Make for each place where an office of the High Court is

established, rules respecting the places and times for holding sittings
of the court, sittings in chambers, the order disposing of business…and
such other matters."
In the superior Courts of Japan, all matters are dealt with by the
Judicial Conference of each court. I have already outlined the legislative
provisions that give form to the Conferences in relation to administrative
staff. In the Supreme Court of Brunei Darussalam, the sittings of the Court
and the listing of matters for trial are dealt with by the Registrar in
conjunction with the Judges and the Chief Justice.
In those jurisdictions in which the Court will go "on circuit" or sit in
Regional areas, the Chief Judicial Officer also deals with the listing of
matters and the designation of a particular Judge to deal with the circuit,
either alone or in conjunction with the Registrar.
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It is worth noting also that in all but one of the Courts20, rules of court
are made either by the Judges in Council or by the chief judicial officer. In
some jurisdictions, the rules are subject to disallowance by the executive or
the legislature. Although not addressed in the survey, it may be interesting to
identify the circumstances in which the executive or legislature can and will
disallow rules made by the Judiciary.
In the vast majority of Courts, the regimes that apply to the internal
administration of listings and procedure are largely free from interference by
the executive or the legislature. This conclusion is significant. The removal
or exclusion of external interference in the assignment of particular Judges to
particular matters, and the exclusion of interference in settling rules of
procedure, also serve to remove or exclude bias, or an appearance of bias,
from the judicial process. External interference in the judicial process, as
distinct from the judicial function, will create an apprehension in the mind of
the community that the Judiciary is merely an administrative organ of the
legislature or the executive. This leads into a discussion of the next section
of the survey, dealing with the administrative structure of the Courts in the
context of the broader public administration.
The purpose of the section on Position of the Court Within the Justice
System was to identify the extent of judicial independence in practice. There
were divergent answers given by the Courts on this topic.

20

The Supreme Court of the Maldives indicated that the President set rules of court in that
jurisdiction.
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In Australia, a comprehensive study of forms of Court governance was
published in 1991. Entitled Governing Australia's Courts21, it provided a
summary of the forms by which Australian courts were managed,
incorporating methods of selecting staff and settling budgets. In that report,
three models of Court governance were utilised to compare and categorise the
Courts studied:
•

The "traditional model" was used to describe those systems of
administration in which the management of the Court fell directly
under the supervision of an administrative officer responsible to a
member of the executive government, usually the Attorney General.
Until the late 1980's, most courts in Australia were administered in this
manner.

•

The "separate department model" was used to denote those systems of
governance in which the provision of administrative services to the
Judiciary was administered by a separate department of state that falls
within the portfolio of a member of the executive.

Management

responsibilities were shared between the chief judicial officer and a
senior administrative officer responsible to the department.

By

reference to administrative services, I mean those services that fall into
the first category that I outlined earlier.
•

The final model was the "autonomous model" in which the chief
judicial officer bears the responsibility for the management of both the
administrative and judicial arms of the Court. In some cases, the chief

21

Church & Sallman, op cit.
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administrative officer is appointed by the chief judicial officer or by
government on the nomination of the chief judicial officer 22.
In analysing and comparing the various courts' structures throughout
the Region, I have utilised these three models. I acknowledge that the three
categories are imperfect, as not every model of Court administration utilised
will fit precisely in one or other of the three categories.
Only two of the Courts surveyed fell within the traditional model in
terms of their administrative structure.

In the Supreme Court of the

Maldives, the administration and management of the Judiciary remains under
the control of the President's office. Interestingly, the administration of the
Supreme Court of Victoria remains under the control of the Attorney General.
Six of the Courts fell within the "separate department" model. All of
the State Supreme Courts of Australia, except for Victoria, fall within this
model. The administration in those Courts is managed by departments that
are structured in a similar manner.

The management of administrative

services for the Supreme Court of Brunei Darussalam is conducted by the
Civil Service Department.
The balance of the Courts surveyed representing the great majority
conform to the autonomous model. What is common to many of the Courts
that have applied this model is that the Judiciary has been constituted as a
distinct department of government as a means of guaranteeing judicial
independence.
22

In that case, a constitutional guarantee of "adjudicatory

This style is also known as a "centralised" form in the United States; Graham C., "Reshaping the
Courts: Traditions, Management Theories and Political Realities", in Hays S. & Graham C.,
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independence" has been carried through to create structures for
"administrative independence".
Much of the previous sections of the survey carried over into the final
section on Court Funding and Expenditure. As I indicated earlier, complete
administrative independence for the Courts is the ideal. However, all Courts
remain dependent on government and, in particular, the legislature for the
funds to maintain their operations and for the provision of administrative
services. In all cases, funds are allocated to the Courts from consolidated
revenue or from an annual budget settled by the legislature. In almost all
cases, Japan being the notable exception, the funds are allocated to the Courts
by the legislature, as an item in a national or provincial budget, or by a
member of the executive from funds allocated to his or her portfolio.
It is notable that in all Courts participating in the survey the budget
estimate is settled either by, or in conjunction with, the chief judicial officer
of each jurisdiction. In many cases, it is the principal or chief registrar of
each Court that has primary responsibility for settling the budget estimates
and bears primary responsibility for the administration of the Court's budget.
This is because the registrar has day to day responsibility for the
administrative management of the Court's services. In a number of Courts
where registrars perform judicial functions these responsibilities rest with an
Executive Officer or equivalent.
I have outlined earlier the constitutional position of the Supreme Court
of Japan. It is worth revisiting this in the context of budgetary arrangements
Handbook of Court Administration and Management, (1993), pp. 3 et seq
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their Court as it provides an example of the most secure method of ensuring
independence while dependent on the legislature and executive for the
provision of funds. Article 83 of the Court Organisation Law provides that
the amount to be allocated to the Courts, as distinct from any broader justice
portfolio, is to be independently appropriated by the national budget. The
budget estimate for the Japanese Courts is prepared by the Supreme Court
Secretariat and receives the approval of the Judicial Conference. Once the
budget estimate is received by the executive, the opinion of the Supreme
Court on the estimate is sought23.
In terms of the final question in this section, an alarming number of
Courts reported that financial constraints have had an impact on the
management of the Courts and the judicial function. For example, the
Supreme Court of Cambodia has acknowledged that lack of funds has
meant that there has been some difficulty in arranging travel for
witnesses in criminal trials.

There is also a lack of Judges with

specialist training and there is little prospect for ongoing professional
training. The Supreme Court of Mongolia has abandoned circuit work
due to a lack of funds to allow judicial officers to travel.
In April of 1997 the then Chief Justice of Australia, Brennan CJ,
announced in the course of opening the 12th South Pacific conference in
Sydney that the eight Chief Justices of Australia's States and Territories had
that day released a Declaration of Principles of Judicial Independence
relating to judicial appointments. It contains a set of principles adopted by
the Chief Justices applicable to Australian circumstances.
23

Court Organisation Law, Article 18 (2)
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Coinciding with this public announcement, the Chief Justices
published the Declaration referring to the Bejing Principles which indicated
that the Declaration specifically took them into account and said:
". . . in any state or country, the key to public confidence in the
Judiciary is its manifest impartiality.
There is a crucial link between judicial impartiality and the principles
of judicial independence, understood as a set of protective
safeguards.

This Declaration of Principles, like the Beijing

Principles, has as its aim the articulation and promotion of the
principles of judicial independence."
The Beijing Principles, by articulating the benchmark principles of
judicial impartiality and the Rule of Law, have the potential to make a
substantial contribution to both the social and economic development of the
Asia-Pacific Region. As the Secretary General of the International
Commission of Jurists has said:
"Far from being a luxury for a poor state, a legal structure which is
quantitatively and qualitatively sufficient to carry out the services
expected of it must be considered one of the necessary components of
a society and a precondition for its progress."24
The adoption of the Beijing Principles represented the achievement of
a remarkable consensus between the Chief Justices of a range of countries from the two countries with the world's largest populations to some of the
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smallest. It was also necessary to accommodate the differences between
those countries within the common law tradition and those within the
continental or civil law systems. The common law tradition is reflected in a
high degree of judicial independence and the absence of a career judicial
service, with appointments made largely from the ranks of the private
profession. The civil law system reflects both a collegiate system and a
career judicial service undertaken as an alternative to private practice. There
are also significant differences in the approach to procedure as between the
common law adversarial system and the inquisitorial system.

The

authoritarian traditions of some countries mark them off from those with
more democratic traditions. There are numerous variations across a wide
spectrum, many of which reflect the divergent cultures of the different
countries in the Region. The achievement of a consensus on the principles of
the independence of the Judiciary in the Asia-Pacific Region was a tribute to
the determination of the Chief Justices to reach agreement on the minimum
standards necessary to secure judicial independence in their respective
countries.

Conclusion
An up-to-date legal framework administered, interpreted and applied
by a sufficient number of persons of ability who comprise the Judiciary is as
much an essential part of the infrastructure of our State as roads, power and
water supply. Conditions conducive to judicial independence need to be
24

Dieng, A The Rule of Law and the Independence of the Judiciary: An Overview of Principles
(1992) at 35.
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maintained and nurtured.

This will allow Judges the freedom to reach

decisions determined only by intellect, conscience and an honest and careful
assessment of the evidence and application of the law. Hopefully, more
provision for the guarantee of judicial independence can be made in Western
Australia by amendment to our State Constitution. Just over a week ago I
presented a paper to a Conference on the State Constitution proposing a series
of amendments required to give constitutional recognition and protection of
the independence of the Judiciary. The making of such these amendments
would bring Western Australia into line with the standards of the
international community in respect of judicial independence.
It is remarkable that a consensus on the standards necessary to ensure
judicial independence has been reached within the Asia-Pacific given that the
countries of the Region are very different from one another. Each society has
its own history, legal tradition, political system, culture, values and priorities.
No single mechanism for maintaining an independent Judiciary can be
transplanted elsewhere without amendment and have the same effectiveness.
Each jurisdiction must reflect on its existing safeguards and evaluate their
effectiveness in securing an independent and impartial Judiciary. 25 Western
Australia has benefited greatly from the international discussion and
agreement about standards of judicial independence in the Asia-Pacific. It is
hoped that the countries of the Asia-Pacific will continue to focus their
attention on the independence of the judiciary and develop policies protecting
that independence.

This will ensure the maintenance of democracy

throughout the Region.
25

Debeljak, J Judicial Independence: A Collection of Material for the Judicial Conference of Australia,
February 2003 at 10
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